
















This article explores the legal bases of autonomy in peacekeeping and whether it has 
developed to such an extent that there are signs of a self-referential legal order governing 
peacekeeping, separate from other legal orders. Given that it will be shown that the principles 
governing peacekeeping are derived from general international law, there must be a 
presumption against there being a self-referential legal order, but the possibility that there has 
been a significant development of specific principles and rules will be explored. Moreover, 
this development may have occurred to such an extent that although the original source may 
remain in international law, a separate legal order has emerged. If the norms of that legal 
order no longer reflect the wider principles of international law then concerns revolve not 
only around fragmentation of international law, but also around the continuing compatibility 
of peacekeeping with international law. 
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Although it does not have a monopoly over peacekeeping, either legally or practically, the 
UN is its leading proponent and practitioner.
1
 It is also responsible for developing a doctrine 
of peacekeeping, in the sense of a body of principles that govern the definition, creation and 
operation of peacekeeping. According to UN doctrine: 
 
Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where 
fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the 
peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military 
model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to 
incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – 




The nature of peacekeeping means that it has to be autonomous in the sense of being separate 
from member states in order to be fulfil its functions when deployed between states (inter-
state peacekeeping) or between factions within states (intra-state peacekeeping). 
Peacekeeping depends on its independent status to ensure that it has the consent and 
cooperation of the parties, whether states or non-state actors, and to ensure that peacekeepers 
are protected persons against whom attacks are prohibited.
3
 Peacekeepers embody the values 
of UN, or other organisations such as the EU or AU, and are more broadly seen as 




Moreover, as Collins has written “legal autonomy implies some degree of institutional 
autonomy”,
5
 meaning that, in the case of international law institutions are important in 
separating law from politics, and demonstrate that international law is not simply the political 
practice of states. Institutions in the shape of inter-governmental organisations may not 
systematically achieve this because their political organs do not always have sufficient 
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separation from states, but in some areas organisations have collectively shaped new areas of 
law out of functional necessity in order to achieve their aims and objectives. In some areas it 
is organisations rather than states that have shaped a particular area of practice and, 
moreover, the norms that regulate it, through articulation of principles of peacekeeping and 
the duties and rights of peacekeepers. The UN can stake a claim for exercising both legal and 
institutional autonomy in the area of peacekeeping, despite its dependency on member states 
to operationalise it. 
 
In order to craft an area of practice and law, such as peacekeeping, there has to be a legal 
separation of the UN or any other relevant organisation from member states. The UN is 
legally autonomous in the sense of having international legal personality and having express 
and implied powers, but this does not solve the practical problem of dependency on member 
states, which is particularly acute in case of UN peacekeeping where the doctrine of UN 
command and control contrasts with the presence and intrusion of the national concerns of 
troop contributing nations (TCNs). Apart from elements of supranationality especially when 
the Security Council is exercising powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN is in 
most respects an inter-governmental organisation and, therefore, the layers of autonomy 
within which peacekeeping might be located can be quite thin. In contrast, the EU is 
commonly characterised as a supranational organisation with concomitant autonomy, but less 
so in the field of security and defence, where the EU is faced with the same issues of 




The presumption in this contribution is that ‘autonomy’ is an explanatory tool, a way of 
understanding the legal regime applicable to peacekeeping, not as a term readily used by 
organisations in the context of peacekeeping. However, this presumption may be rebutted, 
though the evidence is that ‘independence’ is the term used to encapsulate much of what is 
embodied in the discussion of autonomy. The purpose of this article is to explore the legal 
bases of autonomy in peacekeeping and the limits upon it, but also whether it has developed 
to such an extent that there are signs of a self-referential legal order governing peacekeeping, 
separate from other legal orders. Given that it will be shown that the principles governing 
peacekeeping are derived from general international law, there must be a presumption against 
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there being a self-referential legal order, but the possibility that there has been a significant 
development of specific principles and rules will be explored. Moreover, this development 
may have occurred to such an extent that although the original source may remain in 
international law, a separate legal order has emerged. If the norms of that legal order no 
longer reflect the wider principles of international law, then concerns revolve not only around 
fragmentation of international law,
7
 but also around the continuing compatibility of 
peacekeeping with international law.  
 
The fact that the principles governing peacekeeping were so clearly derived from general 
international law in 1956 upon the establishment of the first UN peacekeeping force, 
addresses the main concern about fragmentation expressed by the International Law 
Commission’s Study Group on fragmentation- that it involves the “rise of specialized rules 
and rule-systems that have no clear relationship to each other”.
8
 Indeed, the relationship 
between the peacekeeping regime and general international law fits the ILC Study Group’s 
hypothesis that international law co-ordinates and organizes the cooperation of 
“(autonomous) rule-complexes and institutions”.
9
 Furthermore, it is “general international 
law that provides the rudiments of an international public realm from the perspective of 
which the specialized pursuits and technical operations carried out under specific treaty-
regimes may be evaluated”.
10
 In other words, the legal regime governing peacekeeping, 
shaped by the UN must conform to general international law shaped by all states. However, 
with the UN there is the added complexity of Chapter VII of the Charter, which grants the 
Security Council exceptional powers to override basic principles of sovereignty and consent 
in order to restore international peace and security and, moreover, Article 103 of the Charter 
provides that if obligations arising from Security Council measures conflict with the exiting 
treaty obligations of states, the duties of the Charter including those arising by means of 
Security Council resolutions, prevail. Thus, while it is true to say that generally speaking the 
specialist rule-making found in peacekeeping is the implementation of general and 
indeterminate standards of international law at a specific level,
11
 there is the possibility of the 
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2 Layers of Autonomy in Organisations 
 
The autonomy of organisations embodied in the notion of international legal personality 
explains the legal separation of an organisation from member states, but it tells us little about 
whether there is an autonomous legal order governing peacekeeping, separate from other 
legal orders such as general international law or the national laws of states contributing troops 
to peacekeeping forces (TCNs). Legal personality is seen in doctrinal analyses as the 
foundation upon which organisations exercise legal powers, including the flexible doctrine of 
implied powers,
12
 which is not only the source of UN peacekeeping but it is also the 
foundation upon which separate legal orders emerge such as the legal regime governing 
peacekeeping. 
 
Furthermore, there is the possibility that the peacekeeping regimes of separate organisations 
may converge to become an overarching autonomous legal order, a specialist area of 
international law, particularly when organisations such as the UN, EU and AU work closely 
together in creating and controlling peacekeeping forces. The primacy of the UN in 
peacekeeping matters, however, remains evident. In 2014, the President of the UN Security 
Council, in a statement on cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional 
organisations in maintaining peace and security, emphasised the purposes and principles of 
the UN Charter, its primary responsibility for peace and security, the applicability of Chapter 
VIII of the UN Charter, then stressed the importance for the UN of developing the AU’s 
ability to deploy peacekeeping forces rapidly in support of UN peacekeeping operations, and 
welcomed the support given by the EU to the AU to operationalise the African Standby 
Force.
13
 A resolution on the role of the EU within the UN, adopted by the European 
Parliament in 2015, emphasised the EU’s “full compliance” with the provisions of the UN 
Charter, its “crucial role in promoting the principles and goals of the UN”, but also noted its 
“special responsibility for peacekeeping development and human rights where its 
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 In a review of practice in both UN and non-UN peace 
operations, Bellamy and Williams state that “despite the proliferation of peacekeeping actors, 
the UN has retained its dominant position”. Furthermore, “not only does the UN remain the 
world’s primary peacekeeper by a considerable margin, there is evidence that the Security 




Debate about legal autonomy of organisations normally revolves around the concept of 
international legal personality and the powers that flow from it. Two pivotal International 
Court of Justice cases of 1949 and 1962 consolidate the ideas of personality and implied 
powers and thereby autonomy in that sense of separate legal existence and powers from 
states. However, they do not establish fully the idea of an autonomous legal order as has 
occurred in the EU, largely through the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. 
Autonomy in that sense has not been created by the principal judicial organ of the UN, 
although its opinions of 1949 and 1962 create the foundations for this. In the Reparations 
opinion of 1949, the Court spoke about “the progressive increase in the collective activities of 
States” giving “rise to instances of actions upon the international plane by certain entities 
which are not States”, culminating in the creation of the UN, “whose purposes and principles 
are specified in the Charter” – “but to achieve these ends the attribution of international 
personality is indispensable”.
16
 In the Expenses opinion of 1962, which was concerned with 
the financing of peacekeeping, the Court was of the view that the purposes of the UN were 
broad with “primary place ascribed to international peace and security”. Although states 
retained their “freedom of action” save where they had entrusted the UN with the attainment 
of “common ends”, the Court concluded that when the UN “takes action which warrants the 
assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United 
Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization”.
17
   
 
The earlier opinion recognises the UN as a separate legal entity, while the later case 
recognises that its broad purposes will necessitate an expansion in autonomy. In the case of 
UN peacekeeping, layers of autonomy have been added to the core concept of personality and 
powers, especially with the exercise of legislative and executive competence by its political 
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 It is largely in the latter layer that UN peacekeeping sits, as a product of the 
executive (and sometimes governing and legislative) powers of the Security Council under 
Article 24 (which gives it primary responsibility for peace and security), and Chapters VI and 
VII, which grant it competence over the peaceful settlement of disputes and the ability to take 
action to combat threats to or breaches of the peace respectively. Schermers and Blokker 
categorise the Security Council as a “governing board”, with its own broadly drawn functions 
and powers, independent of the plenary organ (the General Assembly) and, therefore, more 





Peacekeeping has also grown from the executive (as well as administrative powers) of the 
UN Secretary General under Articles 98 and 99. Under the latter provision, the Secretary 
General has the express power to bring threats to the attention of the Security Council and 
had developed implied powers from this to carry out diplomatic initiatives and launch 
inquiries. Furthermore, under Article 98 he has delegated executive competence from the 
Security Council (or General Assembly) to establish and command peacekeeping operations. 
In a way, peacekeeping was initially created in 1956 by a legislative act of the General 
Assembly which, in the face of a deadlocked Security Council and on the initiative of the UN 
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, established a United Nations Command for a UN 
Emergency Force (UNEF) to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in the Middle 
East. It also appointed a Chief of the Command who was authorized to recruit to the force, 
and invited the Secretary General “to take such administrative measures as may be necessary 




In other organisations, peacekeeping is a product of decisions by the political organs, 
exercising executive and other powers. The peacekeeping tasks of the EU find expression 
within its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), originating in the St Malo 
Declaration of 1998, and listed in Article 43(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
Peacekeeping is activated by a decision of the Council, and is run politically by the Political 
and Security Committee established by Article 38 TEU, and militarily by the European 
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Military Committee established by the Council.
21
 More broadly Koutrakos states that the 
‘deep institutionalization of the CSDP and the development of the culture of cooperation 
between its administrative bodies comprising national officials highlight the organizational 
autonomy of the policy’.
22
 Nevertheless, with peacekeeping and peace operations generally, 
the development is in fact due to a combination of institutional policy and lawmaking, 
combined with contributions, consent, and cooperation by member states.
23
 States possess 
military capability, while organisations do not as yet. The UN depends upon standby-
agreements with member states in order to staff a peacekeeping force, agreements that give 




There has been limited integration of military forces within parts of EU membership, but not 
across the membership in whole or in significant part.
25
 In the African Union, peacekeeping 
is based on Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act of the AU of 2000, namely “the right of 
Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security”. 
The authorisation for such forces comes from an executive body, the AU Peace and Security 
Council (PSC), established by a separate protocol.
26
 Again while the development and 
authority come from the institution, military contributions are from member states, although 
there is provision for an African Standby Force, which would be available for intervention in 
the face of grave crimes but also for consensual peacekeeping,
27
 progress towards the 




While these provisions establish the autonomy of EU and AU peacekeeping, both 
organisations have a subsidiary relationship to the UN. The EU’s peacekeeping operations 
have been exclusively outside the EU’s membership and region, in Macedonia in 2003, the 
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DR Congo in 2003 and again in 2006, Bosnia from 2004, Chad and the Central African 
Republic (CAR) in 2008-9, and the CAR in 2014-15, requiring the authorisation of the 
Security Council for that reason, with a number of these forces operating in support of UN 
peacekeeping forces.
29
 AU operations, on the other hand, have been exclusively within its 
membership and region, in Burundi in 2003, Darfur from 2004, Comoros in 2006, Somalia 
from 2007, and CAR from 2013, some of which have been hybrid UN-AU operations 
authorised by the Security Council.
30
 While there is no doubt that the autonomous European 
and African legal orders allow for the deployment of peacekeeping forces within their 
respective regions,
31
 only the UN, through the Security Council, has the universal 
competence to mandate such forces outside these regions and, as the above practice shows, 
there is often a need for a UN mandate and material support within the region as well. As de 
Volder argues in the case of the AU, “this hierarchical ‘partnership’ has prompted 
cooperation, but at the same time has led to controversies in the working relationship 
between” the UN and AU.
32
  
   
In the case of the UN, peacekeeping exploits the space between Chapters VI and VII of the 
UN Charter, building on the benign and non-threatening UNEF model crafted in 1956 during 
the Suez Crisis, when the UN force was, on the one hand, based on traditional principles of 
international law but, on the other, was institutionally (and therefore legally) separate from 
member states. In his initial report on the establishment of the first peacekeeping (or 
“emergency international force”) in 1956, Secretary General Hammarskjold emphasised that 
the first step would be to establish the separateness of UN Command over a force where 
neither the commanders not the troops would be drawn from permanent members.
33
 In his 
second report on UNEF under the heading “questions of principle”, the Secretary General 
pointed out that the model adopted for the first force was an application of the principles of 
the UN Charter, reflected in the separate commander whose “authority should be so defined 
as to make him fully independent from any one nation” and who reported to the Secretary 
General.
34
 This contrasted the delegation of authority and command to the US six years 
earlier in the Korean War, the first example of peace enforcement authorised by the UN 
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Security Council under Chapter VII.
35
 The Secretary General did not rule out the Security 
Council using peacekeeping forces “within the wider margins provided under Chapter VII”,
36
 
but this issue did not arise given that UNEF was mandated by the General Assembly in the 
face of opposition by France and the UK in the Security Council. That meant that UNEF was 
based on clear principles of international law, respecting sovereignty (in the form of consent 
both to the presence of the force and to contributions to it) and non-aggression (on the basis 
that it could not enforce a peace), which seemingly restricted the autonomy of 
peacekeeping.
37
 However, peacekeeping was crafted as a consensual form of intervention 
against a background of a rejection of more coercive military forms of intervention, and its 
benign birth should be contrasted with the more belligerent progeny that came later. There 
was a more practical restriction on the basis that while the command of the operation was 
clearly with the UN, the necessity of setting up the force in short order, meant that “countries 
participating in the Force should provide self-contained units”,
38
 thereby eroding (or 
balancing) the UN’s autonomy in peacekeeping.  
 
It can be seen in these brief reports on UNEF, in which the Secretary General articulates the 
principles of peacekeeping, how he is using his powers under Articles 98-99 to craft a form 
of military operation that exploits the spaces between national sovereignty and international 
authority, between Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter and, moreover, between the 
traditional norms of international law of sovereignty and non-aggression on the one hand and 
intervention by invitation on the other. Moreover, the entirely new concept of peacekeeping 
meant that autonomy could be extended in the application and development of the principles 
of peacekeeping by subsequent practice. Each iteration of peacekeeping has added new layers 
of autonomy: from the Congo force of the 1960s; the multidimensional operations of the 
early 1990s, where peacekeeping was combined with election monitoring; the administrative 
models of Kosovo and East Timor in 1999; to the current Force Implementation Brigade in 
the Congo.    
 
 
3 Elements of Autonomy 
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The UN, EU, AU and other organisations possessing international legal personality are 
legally autonomous from member states, but they still remain dependent upon member states 
to achieve their tasks, especially military ones where troops have to be drawn from TCNs, 
and thereby bringing with them national security concerns into what is intended to be an 
exercise in collective security. This might seem to make it more difficult to claim autonomy 
in peacekeeping and other military operations than in other areas of institutional activity, 
which are not so dependent upon the capabilities of states. For example, international 
organisations can impose sanctions upon other states without positively calling on the 
resources of member states, but the reality is that organisations still depend on states to 
enforce those sanctions. Perhaps a better example would be in the actions of the specialized 
agencies, or programmes such as the UNHCR, who have their own resources that can be put 
into place in times of emergency, without the need to call on states’ resources. However, even 
in military operations, close to the heart of the sovereignty of states, there is evidence of 
autonomy more so in peacekeeping than peace enforcement operations. 
   
In general terms, the above analysis revealed two key elements of autonomy in peacekeeping: 
first the legal independence of the organisation and its peacekeeping missions from member 
states; and secondly, evidence of a self-referential peacekeeping legal order, independent 
from international law and national law. The second element flows from the first in that legal 
personality creates an autonomous space between organization and member states, which is 
consolidated by the creation of peacekeeping forces that are at least in part creations of the 
organisation. Those political organs responsible for their creations enclose them in a legal 
framework, largely to prevent them from too powerful.
39
 Of course there remains the 
possibility that such forces may become more powerful, and the peacekeeping regime is 
stretched to allow for wider and wider action reflected in peacekeeping law that departs 
significantly from general international law. The advantage of autonomy in the shape of a 
self-referential legal order is that it is a specialist area of law developed to regulate specific 
activities, in contrast to the application of abstract and arguably indeterminate principles of 
international law such as non-intervention.
40
 The disadvantage of autonomy is that 
peacekeeping may become isolated from broader community norms, which all states have 
signed up to.   
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3.1 Legal Independence of Peacekeeping 
 
3.1.1 The Power to Create 
 
Without going into a detailed and formalist textual analysis of Articles 36, 40 or 14 of the UN 
Charter,
41
 in general terms the creation of peacekeeping required significant constitutional 
development of the Charter by Dag Hammarskjold, relying on the purposes and principles of 
the UN and the fact that peacekeeping does not violate any express prohibition of the Charter. 
If the UN Security Council can mandate military enforcement action it can mandate a more 
consensual form of military operation, and, if that operation is based on consent of the host 
states or states, then this can come within the UN General Assembly’s recommendatory 
powers on peace and security.  
 
The ICJ in the Expenses case analysed specific articles in its quest to find a legal basis, but 
rather with a view to determining the limitations on the General Assembly’s competence.
42
 
The Court comes close to a doctrine of inherent powers,
43
 although it does not use the term 
“powers” to any great extent. A wide view of implied powers linked to the purposes of the 
UN is the more orthodox way of analysing the approach taken by the Court in the Expenses 
case,
44
 but that is a long way from the idea of implied powers being derived from the intent of 
the founding states. As has been seen, the idea of international organisations having 
competence to create peacekeeping operations was considered to be mainstream by the time 
of the creation of the EU’s CSDP first recognised in 1998, and in the shape of the AU’s 
Constitutive Act in 2000 and its Security Protocol in 2002, in which peacekeeping is 
expressly included.  
 
Despite the rhetoric of subjectivity attached to implied powers, in reality an objective 
approach is taken to the competence to establish and maintain peacekeeping forces rather 
than a subjective one, meaning that the autonomy of peacekeeping is neither derivative nor in 
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the hands of member states, but in the very nature of an organisation having the purpose of 
achieving peace and security. In the case of the EU, although peace is not seen as prominent, 
it can be seen as the primary reason for the creation of the European Economic Community in 
the Treaty of Rome 1957, which stated in its preamble that the founding states were “resolved 
to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty by establishing this combination of 
resources”. In the case of the AU, peace and security is more prominent in the purposes one 
of which is to “promote peace, security, and stability on the continent”,
45
 while the UN’s 
primary purpose is depicted as being the achievement of international peace and security.
46
 
This is supported by the range of powers granted in the UN Charter to the most powerful 
organ, the Security Council, which are exclusively concerned with peace and security.
47
 The 
plenary organ’s powers are also largely designed to create a normative framework to achieve 





The UN’s competence to create peacekeeping forces ceased to be controversial after the dust 
had settled following the Expenses case in 1962; though there was no real hiatus as evidenced 
by the creation of the UN Force in Cyprus in 1964.
49
 The modern day acceptance of 
peacekeeping should not disguise the pioneering nature of its creation in 1956, requiring 
powers additional to the ones expressly granted to the UN in 1945. The extension of UN 
peacekeeping to an intra-state situation in the Congo in 1960,
50
 which dragged the UN force 
into fighting non-state armed groups that threatened the newly independent state’s territorial 
integrity, added to the sense of a voyage into the unknown, in that the benign non-threatening 
version of peacekeeping crafted in 1956 now had a more belligerent and dangerous 
counterpart. While this violent version lay dormant for the remainder of the Cold War, 
allowing for a legal order to be crafted around the UNEF model of 1956, it was re-awoken in 
Somalia in 1993,
51
 and on a number of occasions thereafter. This set the UN on a path 
towards crafting an autonomous legal order to govern both versions of peacekeeping that was 
acceptable to the membership. While the universal consensus around benign peacekeeping 
was readily transferable to regional organisations embodied in the express grants of such 
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competence, there remains controversy over the extent to which regional organisations have 
an autonomous competence to deploy belligerent peacekeeping forces.
52
 In a sense there is an 
on-going debate about the extent to which peacekeeping can be stretched beyond a 
consensual non-violent model based on classical principles of international law.    
 
 
3.1.2 Operations as Organs 
 
Furthermore, the UN sees peacekeeping forces as legally autonomous from states in the form 
of being subsidiary organs of the UN, either created by the Security Council or the General 
Assembly under Charter provisions that allow for the creation of such organs.
53
 The existence 
of a separate peacekeeping budget, based on the UN’s scale of assessments, reinforces the 
idea that this is a collective effort, unlike the decentralised enforcement model used, for 
example in Iraq in 1991, in which the contributing states do not operate under UN command 
and control, the operation is not viewed as a subsidiary organ, and members of the coalition 
pay for their own contributions to the operation. Within the EU, the financing of military 
operations is an exception to the general rule that CSDP activities are paid out of the Union 
budget, expenditure is charged to member states in accordance with the Gross National 
Product Scale, unless a state has abstained in the Council vote establishing the operation.
54
 
However, there is no indication that the EU views peacekeeping operations as anything more 
than a collection of state organs, although there is EU command and control.
55
 In the AU, 
there is provision for collective funding in the form of a Peace Fund in the 2002 Protocol.
56
 
The African Standby Force, when established, would be centrally commanded and controlled 
and would be presumably viewed as a subsidiary organ of the AU but, pending the 
establishment of this force, the model used is one of coalitions of the willing, whereby 
contributing states “bear their own cost and are under the leadership of one nation”.
57
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In the field of peacekeeping the UN exhibits the greatest autonomy and this is further 
reflected in the fact that the UN historically has accepted responsibility for the wrongful acts 
of its peacekeeping forces as subsidiary organs.
58
 However, under the ILC’s Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organisations of 2011, and in some domestic judicial 
decisions,
59
 a factual test of “effective control of conduct” is preferred to a legal test of 
“ultimate authority and control”,
60
 potentially undermining a positive aspect of UN 
peacekeeping in the form of the organisation’s willingness to accept responsibility for the 
actions of its peacekeepers.  
 
The debate about the applicable rules in the ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organisations 2011 revolves around the question whether for the purposes of 
attribution of wrongful conduct of peacekeepers the rule in Article 6 or the rule in Article 7 
applies.
61
 Article 6 states that “the conduct of an organ or agent of an international 
organization in the performance of function of that organ or agent shall be considered an act 
of that organization”, while Article 7 states that the “conduct of an organ of a State … that is 
placed at the disposal of” an international organisation shall be considered an act of the 
organisation if it “exercises effective control over that conduct”. Given that a peacekeeping 
force is both a UN subsidiary organ (as recognised by the UN) and a collection of organs of 
states (in the form of contingents from TCNs) then, in theory, either or both Articles are 
applicable. However, the ILC in its commentary views issues of attribution of conduct in 
peacekeeping operations as coming within the test under Article 7 rather than Article 6.
62
 
That position does not extinguish UN responsibility even when it does not exercise such a 
high degree of control if the UN continues to accept it.
63
 The gradual emergence of the UN 
from behind its shield of immunity in Haiti,
64
 but only in the sense of accepting moral rather 
than legal responsibility for the lethal outbreak of cholera due to the negligence of its 
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 is an acid test as regards the UN’s status as an independent moral and 
legal actor.  
 
Immunity from the jurisdiction of local courts is potentially a negative aspect of autonomy 
although its rationale is to protect the UN’s independence from interference by member 
states. On the other hand, accountability is a positive aspect and its presence would show a 
growing confidence in the robustness of the UN’s legal order, in the sense that the order has 
not only generated norms of conduct for peacekeeping operations and peacekeepers, but that 
compliance and accountability mechanisms are also developing. A developed legal order 
should contain both primary rules and secondary means to ensure compliance, and 
accountability for violation.
66
 However, in the case of the UN, there is scant evidence of the 
latter two components, exemplified in the persistence of unpunished sexual abuse of civilians 
by peacekeepers,
67
 despite the promulgation of a Bulletin prohibiting such by the UN 
Secretary General in 2003.
68
 An example of norm creation by the Secretary General, the 
failure of this Bulletin to prevent such behaviour is largely due to the immunity of 
peacekeepers from local jurisdiction as provided for in the SOFA,
69
 and the fact that 





3.1.3 Command and Control 
 
At a more prosaic level, evidence of legal independence can be found in the structure of 
peacekeeping, with the UN Secretary General being the “organizer, recruiter, and director of 
peacekeeping operations … together with being the nominal commander in chief of, at 
present, nearly 100,000 peacekeepers”.
71
 This manifestation of the independence of the 
Secretary General from member states appears to imbue peacekeeping with greater autonomy 
than the original Charter scheme for peace enforcement contained in Chapter VII. In this 
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unfulfilled part of the UN Charter, the centrality of the Military Staff Committee consisting 
of the chiefs of staff of the five permanent members retains ultimate control of such 
operations with the veto-wielding states in the Security Council,
72
 and certainly much greater 
autonomy than the decentralised system of peace enforcement that has emerged, which does 
not exhibit legal autonomy beyond an often open-ended authorising resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII. While UN-authorised peace enforcement operations are “managed at the 
operational level by a non-UN entity such as a regional arrangement, coalition, or lead state”, 
UN peacekeeping missions are “managed at the operational level by the UN itself (today 
through the Department for Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support)”.
73
   
 
UN command and control is not complete but neither is it a chimera.
74
 Orders are given by 
the UN Force Commander to those in command of TCNs, but there is the possibility that 
some of the more significant ones (for example to deploy a contingent into a more dangerous 
area of the host country) will not be followed after the TCN commander consults with his or 
her government.
75
 There is also the lack of on-going control of specific operations once a 
command is given; but largely UN commands are followed and overall control is exercised 
by the UN over TCNs. Indeed, Johnstone has described the Secretary General’s pivotal role 
in the chain of command as one of “norm entrepreneur”, in that he must interpret the often 
broad terms of the mandate given by the Security Council and exercise his discretion in 
carrying them out.
76
 Johnstone gives the example of the move after 1999 towards Chapter VII 
mandates for peacekeeping operations in order “to protect civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence”, though these instructions are limited by the phrase “within the mission’s 
capabilities and areas of deployment”.
77
 These terms entail the delegation of “considerable 
discretion” to the Secretary General with, for example, robust action to protect civilians being 
taken by MONUC peacekeepers in the east of the DR Congo, “based on an expansive reading 
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of the mandate” including pre-emptive action against some of the armed groups on the 





3.2 Evidence of a Legal Regime Governing Peacekeeping 
 
3.2.1. Key Principles 
 
From Hammarskjold to modern debates in the UN’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping the 
emphasis has been on the trio of principles as the governing norms of peacekeeping: consent; 
limited use of force, and impartiality. In setting up the Congo force in 1960, in a very 
different situation to the creation of UNEF in Suez four years earlier, the Secretary General 
reported that the force (ONUC) was being sent at the request of the government of the Congo 
with its consent, and “although it may be considered as serving as an arm of the Government 
for the maintenance of order and the protection of life”, the force remained under the 
“exclusive command of the United Nations”; it was not under orders from the host 
government nor would it take part in any internal conflict as that would seriously endanger 
the impartiality of the UN.
79
 As the government collapsed after two months, and secessionist 
forces in Katanga fought to break away from the Congo, the UN force had to become more 
interventionist than foreseen by the Secretary General, and indeed engaged in combat by 
taking offensive action against armed secessionists.
80
 The UN tried to maintain its 
impartiality by not forcing a political solution on the Congo,
81
 but its mandate was to 
maintain the Congo as a single state and this necessarily led to armed confrontation with 
secessionist forces.   
 
Despite the evident flexibility within the concept of peacekeeping, allowing for very different 
understandings of the key principles, every year since it was established by the General 
Assembly as a subsidiary organ in 1965, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 
repeats the formula regarding the “guiding principles” of peacekeeping: strict observance of 
the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; “respect for the principles of the sovereignty, 
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territorial integrity and political independence of states”; “non-intervention in matters that are 
essentially within the national jurisdiction of any State”; as well as respect for the more 
specific basic principles of peacekeeping, namely “consent of the parties, impartiality and the 




These principles are adapted from quite basic and orthodox axioms of international law: 
sovereignty; non-aggression and non-intervention; but have proved remarkably adaptable to 
the changing nature of conflict, post-conflict violence and peacekeeping, so that in the most 
recent UN iteration of peacekeeping doctrine (the Capstone Doctrine of 2008), force is 
allowed against spoilers or other non-state actors that undermine the peace. Consent is linked 
to a peace process or peace agreement, and impartiality is in the application of the force’s 
mandate, not neutrality between the parties.
83
 It should be borne in mind that this was 
anticipated by the Congo force in the 1960s, when the International Court of Justice found 
that ONUC did not constitute enforcement action exclusively within the competence of the 
UN Security Council because it was based on the consent of the government and did not take 
military measures against any state.
84
 Nevertheless, the force engaged secessionists, 
mercenaries and other armed groups in combat.  
 
The influence of UN doctrine on regional organisations such as the EU and AU is not simply 
through the UN’s dominance of the field and the fact that it very often mandates regional or 
joint UN-regional operations, but is also due to the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter, which establish the basic legal framework for regional organisations. Article 52 
states that nothing in the Charter precludes regional organisations from “dealing” with such 
matters of peace and security “as are appropriate for regional action”, provided that “their 
activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”. Consensual 
peacekeeping, based on UN principles as developed by the universal organisation outlined 
above, can clearly come within this provision. When it comes to enforcement action, 
however, Article 53(1) states that such regional action must come under the “authority” of the 
Security Council, requiring the “authorization” of that body. Furthermore, the application of 
Article 103 of the UN Charter signifies that any obligations that states have arising out of a 
Security Council resolution prevail over any competing treaty obligations that might arise 
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from a regional mandate. Given that the UN itself has stretched the doctrine of peacekeeping 
closer to peace enforcement, it is arguable that regional organisations also possess the 
competence to authorise more coercive peacekeeping forces, as long as they confine such 




The Capstone Doctrine marked the most recent iteration of peacekeeping doctrine and with 
reports by Boutros Boutros Ghali (Agenda for Peace 1992),
86
 and Lakdar Brahmi (Brahimi 
Report 2000),
87
 peacekeeping doctrine and principles have clearly been shaped within the UN 
system, not by states. This also finds more specific and detailed application in the Secretary 
General’s Bulletins applied to peacekeeping, principally regarding the application of 
international humanitarian law to peacekeepers in 1999;
88
 and proscription of sexual 
misconduct by peacekeepers in 2003.
89
 Indeed, it could be argued that the lack of 
accountability for sexual abuse is, in part, a product of an exploitation of the autonomy of the 
UN by some peacekeepers, exploiting the space between ineffective TCN disciplinary 
systems and a non-existent UN one. 
 
 
3.2.2. Peacekeepers and the Use of Force 
 
One of the guiding principles worth looking at in a little more detail is the principle that 
peacekeepers can only use force in self-defence. The understanding of the right of self-
defence has extended unevenly over the years to cover defence of the individual 
peacekeepers, his comrades and his equipment, to include defence of civilians within the 
control of peacekeepers or within their areas of deployment, and to defence of the ever-
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The reality, however, is that peacekeeping forces have been authorised to go beyond self-
defence when faced with hostile non-state forces. In the case of ONUC in the Congo in the 
1960s, the Secretary General’s initial position was that “men engaged in the operation may 
never take the initiative in the use of armed force, but are entitled to respond with force to an 
attack with arms”; “the basic element involved is clearly the prohibition against any initiative 
in the use of armed force”.
91
 However, it is clear that ONUC had to take offensive action to 
defend the broader mandate, as have subsequent UN forces in the Congo. In the case of 
MONUC, deployed between 1999-2010, “the absence of a viable peace process” meant that 
“peacekeepers were drawn even deeper into the conflicts of eastern Congo”,
92
 requiring the 
support of short-term interventionist EU forces in 2003 and again in 2006.
93
 MONUC’s 
successor (MONUSCO) was quickly engaged in “robust actions against militias in North and 
South Kivu”,
94
 but its inadequacies in protecting civilians and the peace process led to the 
Security Council authorising the creation of an Intervention Brigade “on an exceptional basis 
without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the principles of peacekeeping”, with an 
offensive mandate that included the “responsibility of neutralizing armed groups”.
95
 As Doss 
writes: “in the name of protection and stabilization, the Security Council, by authorizing UN 
forces to carry out, either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC [government forces], robust, 
highly mobile, and versatile ‘targeted offensive operations’, has consciously crossed the 




The UN’s Due Diligence Policy 2013, whereby the UN accepts it has obligations to take 
measures to reduce the risk of human rights violations by non-UN security forces it provides 
support to, is a positive step in the further development of UN peacekeeping law by its 
acceptance of positive obligations of conduct.
97
 However, it is also a negative step at least in 
the sense that it is a recognition of the fact that UN peacekeepers in some operations, for 
example in the DR Congo, have fought alongside government troops in a way that states do 
at the invitation of a legitimate government. Instead of acting as an autonomous impartial 
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The infusion of Chapter VII elements into peacekeeping mandates has introduced the idea 
that the right to use lethal force is grounded in UN Law rather than in those international 
regimes that regulate the use of force by states – the jus ad bellum, the jus in bello, and 
international human rights law. Operating normally outside of an armed conflict, the trend 
has been to recognise that peacekeepers have a very robust right of self-defence that includes 
using force to protect civilians and essential property, but also to protect the mandate, 
meaning that peacekeeping forces should not simply respond to attacks but should be 
proactive and prevent them. That might lead them to engage as combatants and therefore be 
bound by international humanitarian law as recognised in the Secretary General’s Bulletin of 
1999, but even that was a form of incorporation by administrative act into UN peacekeeping 
law.
99
 When not engaged as combatants peacekeepers seem to be subject to a legal regime 
that is not as restricted as provided for in human rights law, which allows state agents to use 
potentially lethal force in self-defence when absolutely necessary in defence of themselves or 





The UN has, in effect, shaped a new law governing the use of lethal force by peacekeepers 
drawing on the powers contained in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter; one that ranges from 
a UNEF model of passive peacekeeping with peacekeepers defending themselves from 
attack, to proactive protection operations with peacekeepers preventing attacks on civilians 
by taking initiatives in using force, to all out enforcement against non-state groups. Bearing 
in mind that, at the same time, UN peacekeepers when not engaged as combatants are 
themselves protected from attacks against them under UN Law by virtue of the 1994 UN 
Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel and by provisions in the Rome 
Statute,
101
 then the result is an independent armed force subject to its own legal regime 
separate from the national legal order of the hosts state, and increasingly autonomous from 
general international law.  
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That, of course, may be immediately appealing as it represents the evolution of a legal order 
specific to the needs and many functions of peacekeeping, but it does represent a significant 
legal development that largely sits somewhere between the relatively tightly restricted 
occasions when authorised agents can use force in peacetime (in human rights law), and the 
general right to use of lethal force against combatants in wartime (in international 
humanitarian law). This may be of greater concern when the increasing use of private 
security contractors by the UN is taken into account, given that UN control over such actors 
is largely of a contractual rather than a military nature, meaning that the application of UN 
peacekeeping law to these forces will be problematic. Although UN doctrine restricts such 
actors to specific tasks such as guarding, which will not usually expose them to military 
action, they remain armed personnel in hostile situations and as such there will be occasions 





3.2.3. Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding 
 
The expansion of peacekeeping forces into peace operations, starting with the multi-
dimensional force in Namibia in 1989, has increased the autonomy of such operations, with 
the so-called “civilianization” of peacekeeping reflecting a trend towards UN administrators 
exercising sovereign powers, most clearly in East Timor and Kosovo in 1999.
103
 Sovereign 
powers cannot easily be reconciled with the UN Charter. Indeed, the necessity of the UN 
exercising sovereign powers when necessary for the purposes of achieving peace and security 
without a clear prohibition on such, encapsulates the idea of inherent powers of the UN rather 
than powers that can be tied back to the intent of the drafters. Although peacekeepers play a 
vital role in these operations, the influence of TCNs has been watered down by the growth of 




‘Peacebuilding’, defined by the UN Secretary General’s Policy Committee in 2007 as a 
"range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by 
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strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the 
foundations for sustainable peace and development”.
105
 It is a distinctly UN phenomenon, 
evidenced by the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission by joint resolutions of the 
Security Council and General Assembly in 2005.
106
 It intimately involves the UN in 
stabilising, often reconstituting, a post-conflict state, something that cannot be entrusted to 
individual states. That Commission has been underpowered in practice due to the reticence of 
key states, but this dependency will be reduced as other UN programmes and agencies such 
as the World Bank, and non-state actors including foundations, charities and businesses 
coordinate their actions. 
  
 
4. Conclusion: Limiting Autonomy?  
 
Of course the direction is not all one way – towards increasing autonomy of peacekeeping 
law and practice. The influence of states, especially TCNs, remains strong so that sovereign 
concerns prevail in a number of circumstances. For instance, the availability of troops for UN 
peacekeeping is weighted in favour of TCNs under the existing standby agreements between 
the UN and states,
107
 referral by TCN commanders of problematic UN commands to their 
governments for approval or not remains endemic, and TCNs from developing countries still 
interpret the rules on the use of force conservatively despite what is stated in UN doctrine and 
in the mandate.
108
 Furthermore, in the case of conflicts between UN and TCN rules of 
engagement the latter may well prevail in practice,
109
 something that is primarily because 
military discipline remains with the TCNs and not the UN. The standard SOFA of 1990 is 
geared to protect the troops from local prosecution but, in so doing, it allows a huge amount 
of TCN discretion being exercised on the issue of accountability of peacekeepers.
110
 The UN 
seems reluctant to do anything about this by, for example, introducing fundamental human 
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rights guarantees into SOFAs or in the form of a Bulletin on Human Rights,
111
 given that it 
might impact on the availability of troops for its operations. 
 
While the above can be represented as a ways of providing checks on the growing autonomy 
of the UN, they also contribute to the lack of accountability of the UN for the misconduct or 
lack of due diligence of its peacekeepers. The lack of accountability is also contributed to by 
UN immunity before national courts,
112
 and also because of the consolidation of the 
“effective control of conduct test” for attribution often giving rise to responsibility on the part 
of the TCN but not the UN.
113
 Consciously or not, by preserving a significant degree of 
control over their military contributions to peacekeeping, TCNs have contributed to what 
might be called the negative autonomy of UN peacekeeping, namely the lack of UN 
responsibility and accountability for the wrongful acts or omissions of peacekeepers.  
 
There is plenty of evidence that there now exists an autonomous legal order governing 
peacekeeping, in which the UN is the dominant lawmaker and actor and in which specific 
rules, for example, on the use of force have been developed. Furthermore, there is some 
evidence that those rules on the use of force are not fully compatible with general 
international law. In addition, while the rule-making element of an autonomous legal order 
for peacekeeping is present, there remain serious gaps in enforcement and redress when those 
rules are breached.        
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